Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1991

Donald F. Acord v. Union Pacific Railroad
Company : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
J. Clare Williams; Larry A. Gantenbein; Attorney for Appellee.
Anthony M. Thurber; Attorney for Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Acord v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, No. 910416.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1991).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/3669

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

UTAH
DOCUMENT

q \d\ i(o fa

K ,*U
OOCKET NO.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

DONALD F. ACORD,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.

Case No.

UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY,
a corporation,
Defendant-Respondent.

91-0A16-CH

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal From a Judgment Entered By
Third Judicial District Court
Honorable Scott Daniels, District Court Judge Presiding

J. Clare Williams
Larry A. Gantenbein
406 West 100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 350-3270

Anthony M. Thurber
Suite 735 Judge Building
8 East Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 533-0181

Attorney for Appellee

Attorney for Appellant

FILED
AUG 3 0 J990
Clark. 9uoremi»f>,.irt IH»K

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
DONALD F. ACORD,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
Case No. 900037

v.
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY,
a corporation,
Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal From a Judgment Entered By
Third Judicial District Court
Honorable Scott Daniels, District Court Judge Presiding

J. Clare Williams
Larry A. Gantenbein
406 West 100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 350-3270

Anthony M. Thurber
Suite 735 Judge Building
8 East Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 533-0181

Attorney for Appellee

Attorney for Appellant

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

JURISDICTION

1

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1

STATEMENT OF FACTS

2

ARGUMENT
I.

FELA, 45 U.S.C SECTION 55, REBUTS THE EXCLUSIVE
JURISDICTION PRESUMPTION OF THE RAILWAY LABOR
ACT AND PROVIDES THE STATE DISTRICT COURT WITH
JURISDICTION TO ENFORCE THE FELA SETTLEMENT
AGREEMENT

3

The FELA, Specifically 45 U.S.C. Section 55, Rebuts The
Exclusive Jurisdiction Presumption Of The Railway Labor,
Act (RLA), And Provides The District Court With
Independent Jurisdictional Grounds To Enforce The
Settlement Agreement Settling Plaintiff Acord's Prior
FELA Action Against UPRR, Because Plaintiff Acord, In The
Instant Case, Alleges That The Termination Of His
Employment With UPRR Violates The Terms Of The Settlement
Agreement, As Opposed to Alleging That His Dismissal Was
A "Retaliatory Dismissal" Proscribed By The Collective
Bargaining Agreement.
<
II.
A.

18 USC SECTION 341 ET SEQ. DOES NOT PROVIDE
DEFENDANT UPRR WITH AN ILLEGALITY DEFENSE

19

18 U.S.C. Section 341 Et. Seq., Which Prohibits Anyone
Under the Influence of Alcohol Or Drugs From Operating,
Or Directing The Operation Of A Common Carrier, Does Not
Preclude UPRR From Performing According To The Terms Of
The Memorandum Agreement Settling Acord's Prior FELA
Action Against UPRR Because The Memorandum Provides That
Plaintiff Shall Not Operate the Engine Unit While Using
Percodan, And Because Acord, As A Fireman Does Not And
Cannot Direct The Operation Of The Engine.

19

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

22

CONCLUSION

23

ADDENDUM

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES CITED
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 94 S.Ct 1011, 39 L.
Ed. 2d. 147 (1947)
6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15
Andrews v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co, 406 U.S. 320, 32 L.Ed. 2d
95, 92 S.Ct. 1562 (1972)
4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 13, 18
Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557, 107
S.Ct. 1410, (1987)
4, 5, 7, 9
Farmer v, Brotherhood of Carpenters, Local 25, 430 U.S. 290, 97
S.Ct. 1056, 51 L. Ed. 2d 338 (1977)
16, 17, 18
Jackson v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 717 F. 2d 1045 (7th Cir.
1983)
10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 18
Johnson v. American Airlines, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 1343 at 1346
(N.D. Tx. 1980)
10, 12, 18
Magnuson v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 576 F. 2d 1367 (9th Cir.
1978)
4, 9, 18
McCall v. Chesapeake & Ry. Co., 844 F.2d 294, at 298-299 (6th Cir.
1988)
9, 10
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County District Council of
Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180, 98 S.Ct. 1745, 56 L.Ed.2d 209
(1978)
16, 17, 18
STATUTES
18 U.S.C. Section 341

19, 20

18 U.S.C. Section 342

20

18 U.S.C. Section 343

20

45 U.S.C Section 55

3, 6, 11, 12, 23

UTAH CODE ANN., Section 78-2-2(j)

ii

1

JURISDICTION
iHiisdi! I inn ni

infei reil upon t h e ill <ili 'jUpLwnu.' LOULI Ln IK ar

t h i s appeal by S e c t i o n 7 8 - 2 - 2 ( j ) , II., C A, 1953 a s amended

("orders,

j u d g m e n t s , and d e c r e e s of any minimi of r e c o r d over win i ("hi I. In-' nnmirf
Il Appeals ill «i.;11.; i n Il have UJ ujiiidJI a p p e l l a t e j u r i s d i c t i o n " | .

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
The i s s u e s on appeal which a r c relPVi'irit" "h" a p p e l l a n t Acoinll riiie
as follows:
mi

Whether

innmpl «;i ni ml iii|ri i list

I IK-, iiidii

court properly dismissed

11 PI i'I-1 mi Mi

plaintiff's

I I ni i ni I pliiint ill I ' • IJ>,I'1II.' in'n'c

(in (mi ni in I

remedy i s t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e p r o c e d u r e s e t f o r t h in I.Lie coJ l e c t i v e
b a r g a i n i n g agreement, between UPRR and p l a i n t i f f ' s
1

I III IK- I 1 1 0 J

I III1

p i (" i . M I I p l

I " C | ) 1 DM I S J i H I ' " .

11I

union,

II I I I '

li" l I I W e ! \/

I i III in I I

Act preclude state court jurisdiction nt plaintiff's claim.
I, Whether plaintiff's complaint states a separate state law
i . t i i i i c nil d e l it in wIIin i ( IIi

iiii

I I i| i I L i i t a L e l y

b t puiL,iiuni

jn utate

court.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Th i s

is i in i in ac t i on

to enforce

a i \ el: t 1 erne n 1",

•jpeei Lieaily Lhu Memorandum. A g r e e m e n t da ted September
settling Acord's Federal Employers Liability Act suit against
in i. * ~ederal district court,
The

t r la I

Respondent/defendanl'

i M>UI t,
UPRR' s

«IIIUI.Iqe

Scott

Moti < HI

Io

/ P I ri i ivt i I I A r m 11 * w e y e I mt; i \/n j i-^nuM I

Daniels,
Dismissif
•••

granted

ruling

that

"' "te d d i i i i i ' i l s t i i c t l i » e

procedure set forth in the collective bargaining agreement and that
there

w a s not any separate

utate
1

law claim which

could b e

legitimately preserved.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff Donald F. Acord was injured while working as a
locomotive engineer for defendant UPRR during June 1979, and, as
a result of that injury, filed a civil action in the United States
District Court for the District of Utah under the Federal Employers
Liability Act (FELA). Pursuant to a stipulation and settlement
agreement between the parties, that action was dismissed.

The

terms of the settlement included a cash payment of $212,500.00 to
Acord

and the Memorandum Agreement dated

September

27, 1982

(hereafter referred to as "Memorandum Agreement") which is attached
hereto as Exhibit "A".

The Memorandum Agreement provided, in

essence, that Acord would be allowed to continue his employment
with UPRR as a fireman (even though he is a qualified Engineer) and
to take prescribed pain medication (Percodan) while on duty, as
long as he did not operate the engine unit while using the pain
medication. From September 27, 1982 until November 4, 1985, Acord
continued to be employed by UPRR.

On November 4, 1985, UPRR

elected to discontinue its performance under the terms of the
Memorandum Agreement and notified Acord by letter dated November
4, 1985, that it was withholding him from further service.

The

reason given by UPRR for discontinuing its performance under the
Memorandum Agreement was that Acord1 s use of the pain medication
was proscribed by its internal "operating" rules, specifically,
rule "G".

Plaintiff Acord thereafter brought an "independent

action" in the United States District Court for the District of
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ARGUMENT
I.

A.

FELA, 45 U.S.C SECTION 55, REBUTS THE EXCLUSIVE
JURISDICTION PRESUMPTION OF THE RAILWAY LABOR
ACT AND PROVIDES THE STATE DISTRICT COURT WITH
JURISDICTION TO ENFORCE THE FELA SETTLEMENT
AGREEMENT.

The FELA, Specifically 45 U.S.C. section 55, Rebuts The
Exclusive Jurisdiction Presumption Of The Railway Labor,
Act (RLA), And Provides The District Court With
Independent Jurisdictional Grounds To Enforce The
Settlement Agreement Settling Plaintiff Acord's Prior
FELA Action Against UPRR, Because Plaintiff Acord, In The
Instant Case, Alleges That The Termination Of His
Employment With UPRR Violates The Terms Of The Settlement
Agreement, As Opposed to Alleging That His Dismissal Was
A "Retaliatory Dismissal" Proscribed By The Collective
Bargaining Agreement.
•ir;::
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Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, (hereafter referred to
as Defendant's Memorandum) at p. 8, (R. 00020).

In support of this

argument Defendant UPRR relied upon Andrews v. Louisville &
Nashville R, Co, 406 U.S. 320, 32 L.Ed. 2d 95, 92 S.Ct. 1562 (1972)
and Maanuson v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 576 F. 2d 1367 (9th Cir.
1978). Specifically, Defendant UPRR asserts that since Andrews and
Maanuson "the courts have uniformly looked through the cause of
action as characterized in the pleadings to the true nature of the
claim, and have deferred to the jurisdiction the RLA in virtually
all cases where claims challenging railroad disciplinary actions
were attempted to be presented in a variety of state common law
causes of action"; and argued that "such cases, including the case
at bar, should be carefully distinguished from the circumstances
and ruling of the recent case of [Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Rv.
Co. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557, 107 S.Ct. 1410, (1987)] wherein the
U.S Supreme Court narrowly held that a workplace dispute which
might be arbitrated as a grievance under the RLA may also be
pursued under the FELA where the dispute includes a claim for
personal injuries based upon railroad negligence."

Defendant's

Memorandum p. 11, fn. 6, (R. 00023).
Defendant

failed,

however,

to

explain

how

Buell

is

distinguishable from the instant case. In Buell, a railroad carman
filed an FELA suit in Federal District Court, alleging that
Atchison had condoned his harassment by fellow employees, causing
him to suffer an emotional breakdown.

Atchison filed an Answer

asserting, inter alia, that Buell1s sole remedy was before the

4

NRAB.

Specifically, the railroad argued that "there is no subject

matter jurisdiction in the district court to entertain an action
concerning a labor dispute between a

x

carrier1 subject to the

Railway Labor Act and its employees."

The district court agreed

with that argument and granted summary judgment on "the narrow
question of the availability to an employee covered by the RLA of
an FELA remedy based on an alleged negligent failure to maintain
a safe workplace."

The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that

Buell's claims were not arbitrable under the RLA, and that an FELA
action

was

therefore

not precluded.

The

Court

of Appeals

additionally declared that a relevant issue was whether a Railroad
employees!s wholly emotional injury stemming from his railroad
employment is compensable under FELA even though that issue had
neither been raised by the parties nor addressed by the District
Court.

The Court of Appeals determined that the FELA authorizes

recovery for emotional injury, and because of the important role
the two statutes play in railway labor relations, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari. Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Rv Co. v. Buell,
480 U.S. 557, 559-561, 107 S.Ct 1410, 1412-1413, 94 L.Ed 2d. 563,
569-570 (1987).
In the Supreme Court the railroad presented a threefold
argument to support its contention that Buell could not bring an
FELA action for his injuries. First, it argued that the exclusive
forum for any dispute arising from workplace conditions is the RLA.
Second, it argued

that even if many workplace injuries are

actionable under the FELA, emotional injuries should not be

5

actionable because of their close relationship to "minor disputes"
that are to be handled under the RLA.

Finally, the railroad

responded to the issue raised by Court of Appeals and argued that
the term

"injury" as used in FELA, does not include purely

emotional injury. The Supreme Court rejected the Railroad's first
two arguments, but refused to address the question whether a purely
emotional injury is compensable under FELA, since the record had
never been developed on the exact nature of the allegedly tortious
activity involved or the extent of the claimed injuries; and since
the railroad's motion for dismissal or summary judgment was based
solely on the ground that the employee's exclusive remedy was to
file an RLA grievance. Buell, 480 U.S. 563-564, 567, 94 L. Ed. 2d
571, 574.
Plaintiff Acord herein asserts that contrary to Defendant
UPRR's contention, the instant case more closely falls within the
holdings of Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 94 S.Ct
1011, 39 L. Ed. 2d. 147 (1947) and Buell, than that of Andrews v.
Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 406 U.S. 320', 92 S.Ct. 1562, 32 L.
Ed. 2d 95 (1972) and its progeny.

The decisions relied upon by

Defendant UPRR in support of its contention that Section 55 was
not intended to provide "independent jurisdictional grounds" are
distinguishable from the present case in a manner which is damaging
to defendant's position. Andrews, for example, is distinguishable
from this case for the reason that the source of the Andrews
claimed

right

against wrongful

bargaining agreement.

discharge was

the

collective

The Supreme Court in Andrews stated:

6

Here it is conceded by all that the only
source of petitioner's right not to be
discharged, and therefore to treat an alleged
discharge a wrongful one is the collective
bargaining agreement between the employer and
the union. Respondent in this case vigorously
disputes any intent on its part to discharge
petitioner, and the pleadings indicate that
the disagreement turns on the extent of
respondent's obligation to restore petitioner
to his regular duties following injury in an
automobile accident. The existence and extent
of such an obligation in a case such as this
will depend on the interpretation of the
collective bargaining
agreement.
Thus
petitioner's
claim,
and
respondent's
disallowance of it, stem from differing
interpretations of the collective-bargaining
agreement...His claim is therefore subject to
the Act's requirement that it be submitted to
the Board for adjustment. (Emphasis added.)
Andrews v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 406 U.S. 320, 324, 32
L. Ed. 2d 95, 99, supra.
The Supreme Court in Buell, supra, distinguished Andrews as
follows:
It is true that the RLA remedy for the
resolution of minor disputes is Nin at least
some situations' exclusive.
Andrews v.
Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 406 U.S. U.S.
320, 325, 92 S.Ct. 1562, 1565, 32 L.Ed. 2d 95
(1972).
In Andrews, an employee brought a
state wrongful discharge claim based sguarely
on an alleged breach
of the collective
bargaining agreement. We held that Congress
had intended the RLA dispute resolution
mechanism to be mandatory for that type of
dispute, and that courts were therefore
foreclosed from addressing claims that properly
arise under the RLA.
In this case, by
contrast, Congress has enacted the FELA to
serve as the statutory basis for the award of
damages to employees injured through an
employee's or co-workers's negligence.
Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 565-566,

7

94 L. Ed. 2d 573, supra.

In the present case plaintiff's right to claim his discharge
was wrongful

does

not arise

from

the

collective

bargaining

agreement between the railroad and his union, but rather from the
special employment or Memorandum Agreement which was executed in
settlement of plaintiff's prior FELA action against Defendant UPRR.
Therefore, despite Defendant UPRR's attempt to characterize the
special employment agreement as a "supplement" to the collective
bargaining agreement, it should be clear that the rule enunciated
in Andrews and the cases which followed it do not apply.

The

"special employment agreement" which settled plaintiff's FELA
action

is

entirely

separate

from

the

collective

bargaining

agreement, and the employment conditions provided therein are
entirely

different

from

those

of

the

collective

bargaining

agreement. Moreover, they represent specific employment conditions
which were negotiated between Plaintiff Acord and Defendant UPRR
in settlement of that action against UPRR, and not between the
defendant UPRR and the union.

The agreement applied to no other

UPRR employee than Plaintiff Acord.
It is therefore clear that UPRR's obligation toward Plaintiff
arises from the special "Memorandum Agreement" of employment which
was delivered as consideration for the settlement of plaintiff's
FELA action, and not from the collective bargaining agreement
between the union and UPRR.
There is persuasive

case law which holds that in such

situations as this, where a separate statutory scheme such as the

8

FELA conflicts with the RLA, the interaction of the two federal
statutory schemes rebuts the exclusive jurisdiction presumption of
the RLA. The Sixth Circuit, in McCall v. Chesapeake & Ry. Co., 844
F.2d 294, at 298-299 (6th Cir. 1988) recently distinguished the
Buell and Alexander line of cases from the Andrews line of cases
relied upon by defendant UPRR in support of its contention that the
state district court lacks jurisdiction because of the preemptive
provisions of the RLA.

That line of cases involved Maanuson v.

Burlington Northern, Inc., 576 F.2d

1367

(1978); one of the

decisions upon which defendant relies. In McCall the two lines of
decisions are addressed by the court as follows:
Atchison, T. & S.F. Rv. v. Buell, — U . S . — , 107 S.Ct.
1410, 94 L. Ed. 2d 563 (1987) is also pertinent. In
Buell, the Court held that a railroad employee is
entitled to bring suit under the Federal Employers
Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. Section 51 et. seq., even
if the employee had the opportunity to pursue a labor
grievance under the Railway Labor Act. The Court stated:
x

This Court has, on numerous occasions,
declined to hold that individual employees are,
because of the availability of arbitration,
barred from bringing claims under federal
statutes. See e.g., McDonald v. West Branch,
466 U.S. 284, 104 S.Ct. 1799, 80 L.Ed.2d 302
(1984); Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight
System, Inc. , 450 U.S. 728, 101 S.Ct. 1437, 67
L.Ed.2d 641 (1981); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver
Co. , 415 U.S. 36, 94 S.Ct. 1011, 39 L.Ed.2d 147
(1974). Although the analysis of the question
under each statute is quite distinct, the
theory running through these cases is that
notwithstanding the strong policies encouraging
arbitration, "different considerations apply
where the employee's claim is based on rights
arising out of a statute designed to provide
minimum substantive guarantees to individual
workers." Barrentine, supra, 450 U.S. at 737,
101 S.Ct. at 1443. •

9

Although Buell stands for the proposition that claims
under substantive statutory rights may be decided outside
of the labor arbitration machinery, it should not be read
to overrule our decision in Stephens or to dictate a
holding in this case that the state act is preempted.
FELA,
the statute involved in Buell, is a federal
statute. Likewise, the statutes in the cases cited by
the Court were all federal statutes. Barrentine, 450
U.S. 728, 101 S.Ct. 1437, involved a Fair Labor Standards
Act claim. McDonald, 466 U.S. 284, 104 S.Ct. 1799, was
an action brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Gardner-Denver,
415 U.S. 36, 94 S.Ct. 1011, was a Title VII case. In the
instant case we are concerned with a state statute. The
issue is not the relationship between two federal
statutes passed by congress; it is the relationship
between a federal statute and a state statute.
In Stephens we anticipated the result in Buell.
Footnote 8 of the Stephens opinion pointed out that the
case involved a conflict between a state statute and a
federal statute, rather than a conflict between two
federal statutes.
We noted that precedent in other
circuits supported the proposition that the interaction
of two federal statutory schemes rebuts the exclusive
jurisdiction presumption of the railway act. It is that
proposition that the Supreme Court later adopted in
Buell. McCaJJL, supra (original emphasis)
Similarly, the Seventh Circuit, in Jackson v. Consolidated
Rail Corp., 717 F. 2d 1045 (7th Cir. 1983) distinguished its
holding in that case from the Alexander and Buell line of cases,
because plaintiff's cause of action in that case was grounded in
a state cause of action and "only federal rights have been held,
under cases such as Barrentine, Hendly, Conrad, and Johnson, to
rebut the preemption of the RLA."

See Jackson, supra at 1051. In

Jackson, a railroad worker was injured on the job and sued the
railroad (Conrail) under FELA.

After Conrail fired Jackson, he

later amended his complaint to add a pendent claim that the
railroad, in violation of his rights under Indiana tort law, had
fired him because he had filed his FELA suit. The district court
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awarded Jackson $13,500 I n compensatory damages on the FELA claim,
$182,000 compensatory damages on the retaliatory discharge claim,
and $1, 260 ,000 pun :i tive damages.

Tl: le Coi in : t: o f A p p e a l s reversed :i n

part the decision of the district court, and held that because
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an FELA action was identical to the claim he would have made if he
had pursued the grievance thorough administrative channels, the
potential interfei enr*» wi I li fedetal leijulatot "y iiil erest.s was toe
great to permit an exception to the RLA preemption doctrine, and
therefore Jackson ! s state tort remedy was preempted by the Railway

preemption was to divest the district court
jurisdiction over Jackson's pendent claim,

damage award to Jackson.

subject matter

Finally, the Court of

It should be noted that in Jackson

the FELA and speci ficalT-

4J U.S.C.

Section 55 was on] y indirectly

relied upon by Jackson +*^ support his clai m that the federal
com
i

;?
;

would

s jurisdiction was ;.*•*; preempted by the RLA. This is because
i•
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discharged
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fact

that
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indirectly implicated by the alleged "retaliatory" dismissal was

not, in the Jackson court's opinion, sufficient to rebut the RLA's
preemption provisions.

The Jackson court therefore distinguished

Jackson's retaliatory discharge claim from cases which directly
involve a separate conflicting statutory scheme as follows:
The present case is distinguishable from Barrentine,
Conrad, and Johnson because neither the FELA, the RLA,
nor any other federal statute specifically provides a
right of action to one discharged under the circumstances
alleged by Jackson. The question is whether the state
tort action for retaliatory discharge buttressed by the
policies underlying the FELA, is sufficiently analogous
to a federal statutory right to rebut the preemption of
the RLA.
Jackson v. Consolidated Rail Corp.f 111 F. 2d at 1050, supra.
Implicit in the quoted language of Jackson is that a "state
tort action for retaliatory discharge buttressed by the policies
underlying the FELA," can, in some cases, be sufficiently analogous
to a federal statutory right to rebut the preemption of the RLA.
Plaintiff Acord asserts that the instant case is distinguished from
Jackson for the reason that Acord's dismissal by the railroad in
violation of the agreement settling his prior FELA action directly
implicates and violates the express statutory provisions of the
FELA and specifically 45 U.S.C. Section 55.

In relevant part the

statute provides:
"Any contract, rule, regulation, or device whatsoever,
the purpose or intent of which shall be to enable any
common carrier to exempt itself from any liability
created by this chapter, shall to that extent be void."
Plaintiff's current action is based upon this specific federal
statutory section because the railroad, by dismissing Acord in
violation of the FELA settlement agreement exempts itself from
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liability created under the act.
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agreement, the obvious argument

j s that the s tate

action is sufficiently buttressed by poli cies underlying the FEI .A
to make it analogous to a federal statutory right.

This argument

f :i ncis s u p p o r t i i it I 11H C Ihv 1 < 11r; 11 f f ei:eni H s I »ef; wHen Jackson and t 11e
instant case

Jackson was able to vindicate hi s rights and pursue

his remedies under the arbitration process provided by

retaliatory dismissals . a;
purpose of resolving

which he bargained
Plaintiff•s

case

n* - A

n fact, the RLA was enacted :oi *.e
'n

those types o: disputes.

;

~n

e

in settling and dismissing his FELA action.
falls within

the

rationale

Gardner-Denver Co. , «i I"« 11 l •' f i»r " "I ". i I

of

1111II

Alexander
3 9 I , Ed

ir
1 17

(1947) as opposed ' ,; z h e rule stated in Andrews, cited above
lllii Alexander the petitioner, a black, f:i ] ed a gr i evance under
the

collective

bargaining

agreement

following

discharge

which

resulted from racial discrimination. Upon rejection by the company

which Alexander t u e c ^ M I U . i iiscriminatioL uomplain>. v» U; rre
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Colorado Civil Rights Commission which was referred to the EEOC.
The arbitrator ruled that Alexander's discharge was for cause.
Following the EEOC's subsequent determination that there was not
a reasonable ground to believe that a violation of Title VII of the
Civil Rights had occurred, Alexander brought an action in federal
district court alleging that his discharge was racially motivated.
The district court granted the railroad's motion for summary
judgment

and

found

that

Alexander

was

bound

by

the

prior

arbitration decision and had no right to sue under Title VII. The
Court of Appeals affirmed.

The case was then appealed to the

United States Supreme Court where the judgment of the Court of
Appeals was reversed. The Supreme Court held, inter alia, that by
merely resorting to the arbitral forum, Alexander did not waive his
cause of action under Title VII and that the rights conferred
thereby could not be prospectively waived and formed no part of the
collective bargaining process.

The Supreme Court held that "the

distinctly separate nature of these contractual and statutory
rights is not vitiated because both were violated as a result of
the same factual occurrence." Alexander/ supra, 94 S.Ct. at 1020.
A key factor in the Supreme Court's reversal of the Court of
Appeals in Alexander, was the Court's determination that where the
collective bargaining agreement conflicted with Title VII, the
arbitrator must follow the agreement.

The Supreme Court reasoned

as follows:
Arbitral procedures, while well suited to the resolution
of contractual disputes, make arbitration a comparatively
inappropriate forum for the final resolution of rights
created by Title VII. This conclusion rests first on the
14

special role of the arbitrator, whose task is to
effectuate the intent of the parties rather than the
requirements
of
enacted
legislation.
Where
the
collective-bargaining agreement conflicts with Title V I I ,
the arbitrator must follow the agreement. To be sure,
the tension between contractual and statutory objectives
may be mitigated where a collective-bargaining agreement
contains provisions facially similar to those of Title
V I I . But other facts may still render arbitral processes
comparatively inferior to judicial processes in the
protection of Title VII rights. Among these is the fact
that the specialized competence of arbitrators pertains
primarily to the law of the shop, not the law of the
land...Parties usually chose an arbitrator because they
trust his knowledge and judgment concerning the demands
and norms of industrial relations. On the other hand,
the resolution of statutory or constitutional issues is
a primary responsibility of the courts...
Moreover, the fact finding process in arbitration
usually is not equivalent to judicial fact finding. The
record of the arbitration proceedings is not as complete;
the usual rules of evidence do not apply; and rights and
procedures common to civil trials, such as discovery,
compulsory process, cross-examination and testimony under
oath, are often severely limited or unavailable...And as
this Court has recognized [ a r b i t r a t o r s have no
obligation to give their reasons for an award." [Cites
omitted] [Emphasis added]
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Company, 94 S.Ct. a I 1011,at
Id.4 , supra.
The instant

case

"

clearly analogous

to Alexander , and

distinguishable from Jackson, for the reason that the arbitrator
in

-;_s case woul d hp

required

il

iniiuw

I lie | u nv 11.11 UL:

• 11 n i

restrictions contained in thfe collective bargaining agreement over
the

ri ghts

and working

conditions

provided

Memorandum Agreement, In Jackson, the p.
by having
penctenl: r\

,

plaintiff

by

the

was not preji idle ed

resort to the arbitration proceedings since
= ci n ip • : ii at, i i t u I idl nry dismissal

his
prnhi.ln I eci

under the collective bargaining agreement. There the FELA was only

indirectly implicated in the dispute, and "the claim raised by
Jackson was identical to the claim he would have made, had he
pursued the grievance through administrative

channels."

See

Jackson, supra, at 1054. In other words, it was at least possible
for Jackson to receive the appropriate relief by resorting to the
arbitration procedures provided by the RLA. In the present case
however, an arbitration board could not possibly grant Acord the
relief he seeks, since the board would be required to follow the
collective

bargaining

agreement

over

Acord!s

Memorandum Agreement with the railroad.

settlement

or

Plaintiff's claim has

nothing to do with the collective bargaining agreement.
Moreover, the Jackson court recognized that not every dispute
involving a carrier subject to the RLA is preempted.

Jackson's

second argument urged that the outrageous conduct of Conrail
required recognition of an exception to the preemption doctrine in
his case as it did in Farmer v. Brotherhood of Carpenters, Local
2£, 430 U.S. 290, 97 S.Ct. 1056, 51 L. Ed. 2d 338 (1977) and Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County District Council of Carpenters,
436 U.S. 180, 98 S.Ct. 1745, 56 L.Ed.2d 209 (1978).

The Jackson

court examined Farmer and Sears as follows:
In both Farmer and Sears the, Supreme Court held that
state claims were cognizable because there were not
preempted by the federal labor laws.
In Farmer, the Court held that a California state court
could exercise jurisdiction over the claim of a local
union officer alleging intentional infliction of
emotional distress. Hill, the petitioner's decedent,
had alleged that, as a result of disagreement with other
union officials, he was subjected to a campaign of
ridicule and personal abuse and was discriminated against
by the union hiring hall. After reviewing exceptions to
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the preemption doctrine recognized in earlier cases,
Farmer, 430 U.S. at 295-97, 97 S.Ct. at 1060-61, the
court stated that one must determine the scope of the
general preemption rule "by examining the state interests
in regulation the conduct in question and the potential
for interference with the federal regulatory scheme."
Id. at 297, 97 S.Ct. at 1061.
In applying this test to Hillfs claim the Court fir st
noted that the state had a substantial interest in
protecting it citizens from the alleged outrageous
conduct.
Id. at 302, 97 S.Ct. at 1064. The court
recognized that, because the abusive conduct was
intertwined
wi th
allegations
of
hiring
hal 1
discrimination, there was some potential that Hill's
state claim would touch on areas generally within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB).
The potential interference did not
overcome the state's interest, however, because
resolution of the state tort suit turned on whether the
union's actions had caused Hill severe emotional distress
whereas the focus of an unfair labor practice inquiry
would have been on whether the union's conduct
discriminated against Hill in terms of employment
opportunities. As a result, the tort action could be
resolved "without reference to any accommodation of the
special interests of unions and members in the hiring
hall context." Id. at 305, 97 S.Ct. at 1066
Similarly, in Sears, the Court held that Sears could
rely on state trespass laws in seeking an injunction
against union picketing on its private property. As in
Farmer, the primary focus of the Sears Court was on
whether recognition of the state trespass law would
interfere with the federal regulatory scheme. The Court
stated:
IJI^Q critical inquiry, therefore, is not
whether the State is enforcing a law relating
specifically to labor relations or one of
general application but whether the controversy
presented to the state court is identical (as
in (Garner) or different from (as in Farmer)
that which could have been, but was not,
presented to the Labor Board.
iu, 4oo

U . D . au xy/, yd

S.C t. ai ±/o/.

Applying

this

test to the facts presented in Sears, the Court found
that the focus of the state trespass proceeding would be
on where the picketing occurred - private property whereas the focus of an unfair labor practice proceeding
would have been on the objective of the picketing. Id.
17

at 198, 98 S.Ct. at 1758.
Jackson v. Consolidated Rail Corp., at 1051-52, supra.
The Jackson Court's comments concerning the holdings in Sears
and Farmer find equal application here.

As in Sears, the same

matrix of facts could give rise to both a state cause of action and
a cause of action which would trigger the preemptive provisions of
a federal act, in this case the RLA.

For instance, if Acord

had

alleged that his dismissal was a retaliatory dismissal instead of
alleging, as he did, that his dismissal was a violation of the
settlement agreement settling his prior FELA action against UPRR,
there is no question that his action would be preempted. The fact
that this case concerns the termination of Acord1s employment with
the railroad is somewhat misleading, because Acord is seeking to
enforce his rights under the FELA settlement agreement which he
directly negotiated with the railroad, and not his rights under the
collective bargaining agreement negotiated by and between the union
and the railroad. The possibility that this case may necessitate,
as a collateral matter, some interpretation of the collective
bargaining agreement does not trigger the preemptive provisions of
the RLA. See, for example, Johnson v. American Airlines, Inc., 487
F. Supp. 1343 at 1346 (N.D. Tx. 1980) wherein the district court
distinguished that case from Andrews, and Maanuson, inter alia, as
follows:
The thrust of plaintiffs1 complaint in this case,
however, is not a contract right, but the right not to
suffer from discrimination based on age. The fact that
this determination may necessitate, as a collateral
matter, the interpretation of a collective bargaining
agreement does not require that plaintiffs pursue the
18

union grievance procedure prior to bringing their ADEA
claim.
Based

upon

the foregoing,

interaction with uie r" ,'
jn

thl s

plaintiff

submits

that the

a separate conflicting federal scheme,

ca-^p tbp . ;.; .

rebuts

the excl usive

jurisdiction

presumption <•: uv; «...- The possibility that determination of th :i s
case ma} nea.h-.i; ;,., .

ol lafera! innf t PI

i ntnrprptat ion of the

collective bargaining agreement does not require that plaintiff
exhaust his RLA arbitration remedies before pursuing his claim for
enforcement" nIL J!L" < "™" * .settle
court

does

have

,nl

' greernent"

tut requisite

" Irih-' ciiist m i :

urisdiction

enforce

that

agreement.
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ILLEGALITY DEFENSE-
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WITH

AN

18 U.S,C, Section 341 Et. Sea, , Which Prohibits
Anyone Under the Influence of Alcohol Or Drugs
From Operating, Or Directing The Operation Of
A Common Carrier, Does Not Preclude UPRR From
Performing According To The Terms Of The
Memorandum Agreement Settling Acord's Prior
FELA Action Against UPRR Because The Memorandum
Provides That Plaintiff Shall Not Operate the
Engine Unit While Using Percodan, And Because
Acord, As A Fireman Does Not And Cannot Direct
The Operation Of The Engine,
] 8 IJ S C

Sect:i c n 3 11 • = • I: seq

w. i

idd (M1 II

|-111 - \ ede ra 1

criminal code as part of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Public
Law, 99 -570

I t creates a new felony c: operating or directing

1 • I in e c i p e r a t :i c • n

alcohol or dr ugs.

c f a z: JIMIO n c: a i: i: :i e i: w I

i f 1 u e 11 c L

Defendant, j n its Memorandum i n Support

Motion to Dismiss, (R. 00029-00031), relied upon the new enactment
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Il

as support for the argument that it is precluded by federal law
from performing according to the terms of the September 27, 1982
Memorandum Agreement and is therefore excused from performance.
The relevant language of the statute, found in Section 342, does
not support defendant's UPRR's contention.

Section 342 provides:

Whoever operates or directs the operation of a common
carrier while under the influence of alcohol or drugs,
shall be imprisoned not more than five years or fined
not more than $10,000, or both. (Emphasis added.)
The Memorandum Agreement, at page 2, provides:
Engineer Acord shall not operate the engine unit while
using such medication. (Emphasis added.)
The Memorandum Agreement therefore provides by its plain
language that plaintiff shall not operate the engine unit while
using the pain medication.

As a fireman he does not and cannot

"direct the operation" of the engine.

Thus, defendant UPRRfs

reliance upon Section 341 et seq. is misplaced.

Neither the

statute nor any regulation promulgated thereunder, renders the
Memorandum Agreement void or unenforceable as claimed.
Assuming arguendo that some interpretation of the statute or
the agreement might possibly render the Memorandum Agreement
unenforceable, there are factual questions that cannot be resolved
on motion.

Section 343 creates a presumption that a person is

under the influence of a drug if the "quantity of the drug in the
system

of the individual would be sufficient

to impair the

perception, mental processes, or motor functions of the average
individual".

There is nothing in the Memorandum Agreement which

requires Acord to take the pain medication at all, let alone in
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quantities that would impair his perception, mental processes or
motor functions; nor is there any evidence in the record that
plaintiff would be impaired or perform his duties in an unsafe
manner while using his prescribed pain medication (Percodan) in the
prescribed doses.
Finally, it should be noted that the Percodan was prescribed
for control of Acord's pain by the defendant's own physician in
advance of the Memorandum Agreement.

This drug was prescribed

because Acord was allergic to codeine compounds. (Deposition of
Dr. McKinney, Civil No. C81-0297J).

According to the defendant's

own statement in the November 25, 1985 letter from J.R. Hart to
plaintiff Acord's attorney, Anthony M. Thurber, Exhibit "B", (R.
00055), Acord's removal from service was based upon the judgment
of UPRR's physicians, and not upon any federal law or regulation
as is now claimed:
As clarification, Mr. Acord was not removed from service
because of federal regulation.
He was removed from
service based upon the judgment of company doctors.
It was the company doctors who prescribed the Percodan which
Acord was taking at the time of the Memorandum Agreement and at
the time of his removal from service. The company doctors not only
prescribed the medication, but continued to renew the prescription
after the Memorandum Agreement was executed and until Acord's
removal from service.

According to UPRR, it relied upon the

judgment of these same doctors as the basis for Acord's removal
from service.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Appellant's argument is summarized as follows:
1. Plaintiff's action is to enforce a contractual employment
agreement given by defendant UPRR as partial consideration for a
negotiated settlement of plaintiff's FELA claim, and does not
involve or arise from the collective bargaining agreement (CBA)
between the defendant UPRR and plaintiff's union. The pre-emptive
provisions of the Railway Labor Act (RLA) for that reason do not
apply to plaintiff's claim.

The state district court accordingly

has an independent jurisdictional basis to enforce the private
employment agreement between the parties without regard to the
procedures required by the RLA for enforcement of a CBA.

The

parties' agreement is in that respect no different than any other
contract

between

private

citizens

subject

to

state

court

jurisdiction.
Under applicable federal decisions the interaction with the
RLA of a separate conflicting statutory scheme, in this case the
FELA, rebuts the exclusive remedy presumption of the RLA. Without
that pre-emption, plaintiff's claim is actionable in state court
as any other private contract.
2.

Defendant's illegality defense is not viable because the

subject agreement precludes plaintiff from operating an engine
while using Percodan, and as a Fireman plaintiff cannot and does
not direct the operation of the engine.
3. A fact issue precluding summary judgment exists concerning
whether medication at the prescribed levels would be "sufficient
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to impair the perception, mental process or motor functions of the
average individual", even assuming that a defense of illegality is
available.
4.

Defendant's own physicians prescribed the medication

Percodan both before and after the parties' Memorandum Agreement
and decided upon plaintiff's removal from service because he took
the medication.

Under

those

circumstances

it

appears

that

defendant UPRR simply decided against further performance under the
agreement. Such conduct constitutes a "device" enabling a carrier
to exempt itself from FELA liability which is made void by federal
law (45 U.S.C. Section 55).
CONCLUSION
For any or all of the foregoing reasons, plaintiff's action
for enforcement of the Memorandum Agreement should be maintainable
in state court.

The District Court's dismissal of the action on

jurisdictional grounds constitutes error and should be reversed.
DATED this

-7^

da

Y

of

August, 1990.
Respectfully submitted,

Anthony M. Thurber
Attorney for the Plaintiff

23

^^=u^-

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing Brief,
postage prepaid, this 2ff

day of August, 1990 to the following:

J. Clare Williams
Larry A. Gantenbein
Attorneys for Defendant
406 West 100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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EXHIBITS

MEMORANDUM AGREEMENT
PR-013

(Donald F. Acord)
Locomotive Engineer DONALD F. ACORD, Salt Lak-e City,
has an engineer's seniority date of May 19, 1975, and fireman's
seniority date of July 1, 1974,
This man has a history of a job related injury occurring in June, 1979, while working in his routine employment as
a Locomotive Engineer. He now has difficulty sitting for prolonged periods of time due to pain in his low back and in
performing certain other duties of an engineer and fireman.
Union Pacific's Medical Director has reviewed the
medical history of Mr, Acord and has medically released him to
perform (as his ' seniority permits), the duties of an engineer
or fireman, insofar as such duties will allow him to stand,
twist, and bend to s^ret^h b^.ok and lee muscles sufficicntlv
to alleviate any pain and discomfort as the need arises.
Mr. Accra's personal physician has advised that Mr. Acord
should avoid lifting, pulling or otherwise exerting forces in
excess of forty (40) pounds, and that it is appropriate that
Mr. Acord take pain medications as necessary.
In order to minimize Mr. Acord's physical discomfort
and provide him continued railroad employment in his craft (to
the extent his seniority will permit), it has been proposed that
Engineer Acord be tamoorarily ex^Tpt from ^,n^ 1 abcr contract
requirement to remain on the engineers' working list whenever
his seniority will permit, and that he be permitted instead to
exercise his - fireman's seniority on "must-fill" and other fireman
assignments as agreed to below.
ACCORDINGLY, IT IS AGREED:
While this Agreement is in effect, Engineer Donald F.
Acord shall be released from performing service as a Locomotive
Engineer to which he may be entitled by his Engineer's seniority,
during which time he shall be permitted to perform service as a
Fireman on any "must-fill" road freight or passenger assignment,
or displace any junior fireman wcrkincr a biankabie assignr.ent in
accordance with his fireman's seniority, so long as a junior
fireman can hold such assignment. In the event no junior
fireman can hold a biankabie assignment, he must displace a
junior fireman on a "must-fill" road freight or passenger assignment. In the event such "must-fill" fireman assignment in road
freight cr passenger service is not available, or he exhausts
his fireman's seniority on such "must fill" assignments, he may
then exercise his fireman's seniority' to any available road
freight, yard or hostler assignment, subject to the conditions
hereinafter set forth.
Engineer Acord shall net be required to lift or pull
anything requiring forces to be exerted in excess of twenty-five
(2 5) pounds while performing work in accordance with the terms
of this Acreement.

- 2 PR-013
(Donald P. Acord)
Engineer Acord, while working as fireman, shall be
allowed to take his pain medication as may be necessary while
on duty- Engineer Acord shall not operate the engine unit
while using such medication.
While on duty, Engineer Acord shall be allowed to
stand, twist, and bend to stretch his back and leg muscles as
necessary to alleviate his back discomfort.
Engineer Acord shall not be force-assigned to other
assignments while working as a fireman on "must-fill" or AiMTRAK
assignments.
The conditions set forth above shall continue in effect
until such time Donald F. Acord's condition improves sufficiently
to enable him to again resume service as a Locomotive Engineer
in accordance with his seniority, in which case and at which
time this Agreement shall automatically terminate.
Dated this %ljhlday

of

BROTHERHOOD OF LOCOMOTIVE ENGINEERS
3

'• 4-

1982
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UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY

.7

I

J&Z2LL

General Chairma'r

SenTesIr Director of Labor Relations

0

UNITED TRANSPORTATION UNION

Geneeral /Ch*a"irmaii" Q

'0

Engineer Donald F. Acord

x

(E)

General Manager

EXHIBIT "B"

November 25, 1985
PR-013 (D. F. AcordK^"
Mr. Anthony M. Thurber
Attorney at Law
Suite 735, Judge Building
8 East Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Dear Mr. Thurber:
This refers to your letter dated November 12,
1985 concerning fixture-fireman Donald F. Acord.
Contrary to your assertions, withdrawal of
Fireman Acord from service does not violate the terms
of the Labor Agreement under which he was working as a
fixture-fireman. That Agreement permits Fireman Acord
to use pain medication as necessary but does not give
him a license to use as pain medication drugs which
render him unfit for service. All the Company wants is
for Mr. Acord to discontinue use of Percodan, which
according to our doctors is not acceptable, and to
substitute in its place some other acceptable pain
medication.
As clarification, Mr. Acord was not removed
from service because of federal regulations. He was
removed from service based on the judgement of Company
doctors.
If Mr. Acord feels that his rights under the
controlling Labor Agreement (i.e., the Agreement under
which he is restricted to service as a fireman) have
been violated, he should handle the matter through his
Labor Union as a grievance.
Yours truly,
Original Signed
J. R. Hart

cc:

Mr. A. W. Rees
Mr. R. L. Jones

ACH/K/1125/M

ADDENDUM

J. CLARE WILLIAMS, #3490
LARRY A. GANTENBEIN, #4576
Attorneys for Defendant
406 West First South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 595-3270
IN AND FOR THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
DONALD F. ACORD,

)
ORDER GRANTING MOTION
) TO DISMISS

Plaintiff,
v.

)

UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY,
a corporation,
) Civil No. C-88-5848
Judge Scott Daniels
Defendant.
)
Defendant Union Pacific Railroad Company's Motion to
Dismiss for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction having been

submitted to the Court for decision in accordance with Rule 4-501
of the Court's Rules of Practice, and the Court having considered
the arguments and positions of the parties as submitted through
supporting memoranda, affidavits and other documentary evidence,
and having been fully advised and informed in the premises and
having

entered

ordering that

its

"Minute

Entry"

dated

November

28, 1989,

said Motion to Dismiss be granted, makes the

following ruling and order:
The Court rules that plaintiff's exclusive remedy with
respect

to

the

claims

set

forth

in

his

complaint

is

an

administrative one as described
agreement,

and

in his collective bargaining

that plaintiff's

complaint

does

not

state

a

separate state law cause of action which can legitimately be
pursued in this Court.
Accordingly, since the Court does not have jurisdiction
over the subject matter of plaintiff's complaint, IT IS HEREBY
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that said complaint be dismissed, as a
matter of law and with prejudice, each party to bear their own
costs and expenses.
DATED this

iD

day of December, 1989.
BY THE COURT:

lonorable Scott Daniels
District Court Judge
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that on the

day of December,

1989, I served by U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, a true and correct
copy of the foregoing Order Granting Motion to Dismiss upon:
Anthony M. Thurber, Esq.
8 East Broadway, #735
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

w

Secretary/

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS
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